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The US military has made considerable progress in developing counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy and doctrine, including the publication of 
Army Field Manual 3-24 and the military’s successes in working with the 
population to stem the insurgency in Iraq. The short-term goals of COIN 
are now fairly well understood: engage the population and win their sup-
port. Whichever side wins the support of the population—either the host 
nation (and US forces that support it) or the insurgents—wins the battle.
The battle is not the war, however. The long-term goal of a coun-
terinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a gov-
ernment that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote 
regional and international stability; this achievement is victory in a coun-
terinsurgency. Transitioning from the short-term success of population en-
gagement to long-term viability of the host nation is far more difficult and 
less understood.
It is important for the military to understand the long-term goals of 
counterinsurgency in order to take the appropriate measures in the near-
term that support the objective of creating a functional state. To that end, 
this article outlines three analytical stages to achieve victory in COIN: 
population engagement, stability operations, and the creation of a function-
ing state. It contends that actions taken in the early stages of COIN should 
always keep in perspective the long-term goal of creating a viable state. 
Without this foresight, actions taken in the short-term may undermine the 
stability of the state and result in defeat.
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Stage 1: Population Engagement
Most scholars agree that insurgency is a form of political violence 
that aims to challenge the existing authority in a state, be it the government 
or an occupying force. Insurgent violence, in other words, is not random vi-
olence but violence with a greater purpose. French insurgency expert David 
Galula defines an insurgency as “a protracted struggle conducted methodi-
cally, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives, leading 
finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”1 The US Army and Marine 
Corps counterinsurgency field manual echoes this definition, describing in-
surgency as “an organized, protracted, politico-military struggle designed to 
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying 
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”2
Unlike conventional wars, where one military aims to defeat anoth-
er on the battlefield, the center of gravity in insurgencies is the population.3 
In other words, the battle between insurgents and the state is a tug-of-war 
for the loyalty and support of the population. Galula contends: 
If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsur-
gent [the government], to control it physically, to get its active support, he 
will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power 
depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on 
its submissiveness.4
Without the population’s support, insurgents cannot survive. Likewise, 
without the population’s support, a state’s government lacks legitimacy 
and is unlikely to survive.
A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires winning the pop-
ulation away from insurgents by drawing on a mixture of kinetic and 
nonkinetic actions. Finding the balance between kinetic and nonkinetic op-
erations is perhaps the greatest challenge in the early stages of a counterin-
surgency.5 If the goal is to build rapport with the population and win their 
trust, then kinetic operations alone are unlikely to achieve this end. If the 
population and insurgents are intertwined, as they usually are in the early 
stages of COIN, then kinetic operations run the risk of collateral damage 
to the individuals and infrastructure, which will cause a loss of trust and 
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support. The ability to establish a permissive environment and the threat 
of force are necessary ingredients in COIN, however; without the threat of 
force, it is unlikely that insurgents or even the population will alter their 
behavior. COIN, therefore, requires the use of sticks andcarrots; the chal-
lenge for counterinsurgency forces is how to apply both in a manner that 
establishes security, builds rapport with the population, and wins their 
trust. In order for the short-term success of population engagement to take 
root, the military needs to transform the initial rapport developed with the 
population into sustainable efforts and projects that work toward the cre-
ation of a viable state.
Stage 2: Stability Operations
Population engagement and stability operations are two analytical-
ly distinct stages yet, in practice, are connected.6 The actions accomplished 
to build credibility and trust in the early stages of COIN directly impact 
stability operations. Both population engagement and stability operations 
should, in turn, feed into future efforts to reconstruct the host nation. The 
US Army field manual on stability operations emphasizes that stability op-
erations begin in the earliest stages of engagement:
For many agencies and organizations, stability operations are considered as 
part of broader efforts to reestablish enduring peace and stability following 
the cessation of open hostilities. For military forces, however, stability tasks 
are executed continuously throughout all operations. Executed early enough 
and in support of broader national policy goals and interests, stability opera-
tions provide an effective tool for reducing the risk of politically motivated 
violence.7
In other words, population engagement and stability operations need 
to support the long-term goal of creating a viable state in order to be 
truly successful.
Stability operations are the most difficult stage of long-term suc-
cess in COIN because they are the point when military and civilian respon-
sibilities meet and the military should, in theory, hand off most nonmilitary 
capacity-building responsibilities to civilians. This point of collabora-
tion—what the stability operations field manual calls “the whole-of-gov-
ernment approach”—faces several challenges, including varying capacities 
among agencies, ambiguity regarding command and control, and different 
organizational structures and cultures.8 In recent stability-building efforts, 
blending military and civilian contributions has been one of the most vex-
ing challenges.
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Stability operations are also the most difficult stage in the long-term 
application of a counterinsurgency program because they require build-
ing sustainable capacity within the populace and government that will 
determine the viability of the state. A functioning state needs, first and fore-
most, human capital in order to be self-sustaining and provide for its popu-
lation. This includes leaders, technical experts, security forces, educators, 
and healthcare providers. War-torn nations often lose human capital, a phe-
nomenon known as “brain drain.” Therefore, stability operations need to 
emphasize developing and retaining human capital in order to support the 
long-term goal of a viable state.
In addition to developing and retaining human capital, most nations 
will also require investment in their physical infrastructure, either because 
it has been damaged during the conflict or did not exist in the first place. 
Physical infrastructure, however, should not be developed without the hu-
man capacity to maintain it; otherwise it will not be sustainable in the long-
term. The emphasis should initially be on developing human capital, then 
developing a sustainable infrastructure.
Stability operations are typically divided into several tasks or “pil-
lars,” although there is little agreement regarding the number of pillars or 
what they are called. The US Army field manual on stability operations 
names five core tasks: providing civil security, establishing civil control, 
restoring essential services, supporting governance, and enabling eco-
nomic and infrastructure development.9  The manual also stresses that in-
formation engagement, while not a stability operation per se, is a critical 
component of operations and should compliment and reinforce the five 
core tasks. The State Department identifies five tasks: security; justice and 
reconciliation; humanitarian and social well-being; governance and par-
ticipation; and economic stabilization and infrastructure [development].10 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies Post-Conflict Recon-
struction Project lists four pillars: security and public safety; economic and 
social progress; governance and participation; and justice and reconcilia-
tion.11 The US Institute of Peace names five pillars: safe and secure envi-
ronment; rule of law; stable democracy; sustainable economy; and social 
well-being.12
Four essential pillars are outlined in the following text—security, 
economics, governance, and justice—and two additional pillars important 
for transitioning a state from failing to viable—social capital and national 
identity—are also considered. With each of these pillars, the focus should 
continue on engaging the population and working with and through the 
people to build a sustainable state.
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Security
Security may seem like an obvious concept to define—the absence 
of violence—but in a COIN environment, the goal of security is much more 
than nonviolence. For example, sufficient number of forces could effective-
ly control a population and prevent violent activity through the imposition 
of curfews, checkpoints, and patrols. In a COIN environment, however, vi-
olence is a symptom of a greater problem; it is a means to compel social 
and political change. Defining security as simply the absence of violence, 
therefore, is only treating the symptoms and not the root of the problem.
In a COIN environment, security considerations need to include the 
perception of safety, which will most likely be based on factors other than 
just the presence or absence of violence. Psychologist Abraham Maslow 
uses the term “safety needs” in his pyramid of human needs to describe 
the desire to feel secure. Safety needs encompass physical security, but 
also include social aspects, such as a sense of community, and a daily rou-
tine and predictable future. Maslow also identifies religion and philosophy 
as important safety needs, providing a sense of purpose and existential di-
rection.13 In a COIN environment, therefore, it is better to think of security 
as more than the absence of violence; it is the mixture of physical, com-
munal, and psychological needs that makes the population feel safe, sta-
ble, and hopeful for the future. Achieving a sense of safety in a population 
therefore goes beyond deploying security forces; it requires developing all 
the pillars of stability operations and a government capable of supporting 
and providing a stable economic, political, and security environment.
Economics
The long-term goal of the economic pillar is to create a legitimate 
and sustainable gross domestic product, which provides food and other 
necessary items to the population and an import and export economy that 
does not result in deficit spending. A healthy economy should provide the 
opportunity for the population’s work force to engage in stable, sustainable 
and, preferably, meaningful employment.
Supporting the host nation in the creation of a legitimate economy 
in a COIN environment is perhaps the most difficult task US forces and 
civilians face. During a counterinsurgency, civil war, or failing state, the 
government typically is unable to provide goods and services for its popu-
lation, and gray markets (legal goods sold illegally) or black markets (il-
legal goods sold illegally) emerge to fill the demand.14 Insurgents, in fact, 
often use goods and services as a means of enticing the population’s sup-
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port, becoming the defacto government in their areas of operation. More-
over, crime and black markets, such as weapons and drug trafficking, often 
go hand-in-hand with insurgencies and often reinforce one another. These 
illegal economies eventually need to be brought under the jurisdiction of 
the government or otherwise curtailed; their continued operation undercuts 
the legitimacy of the state.
If black markets and insurgent services are the primary source of 
employment and sustenance for the population, however, the illicit mar-
kets cannot be terminated without providing legitimate goods and servic-
es in their place. Without these replacement services, the population will 
most likely suffer deprivation and come to resent the occupying powers 
and government for closing vital markets, thereby diminishing trust in 
leadership. Shutting down illicit economies can have the effect of putting 
people out of work and deposing local or national leaders, providing addi-
tional motivation for the populace to join insurgent groups. Transforming 
an illegitimate economy into a legitimate one is always a tricky undertaking.
The Guide forParticipants inPeace,Stability,andReliefOpera-
tions integrates physical infrastructure into the economic pillar of recon-
struction, recognizing the critical importance of roads, electrical grids, 
water supplies, and so on as essential for creating a stable economy. The 
Guide also recognizes the need to develop and manage natural resources 
in a manner promoting equity among a state’s citizens.15 This last point is 
especially important in a nation like Iraq, where oil wealth has to be man-
aged in such a manner to not favor one group or region over another.
Governance
Governance, broadly, involves how a state is managed and run. The 
long-term goal of a nation’s governance should be establishing a relation-
ship between the government and its people whereby the government pro-
vides safety and security, economic opportunity, goods and services, and 
transparency, while the population, in return, gives up some of its liber-
ties, freedoms, and income in the form of taxes to follow the rules and 
authority of the state. Governance, therefore, involves the interaction be-
tween a state’s leaders, the goods and services it provides a population, 
and the population’s support and cooperation with the state. Eighteenth-
century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau and nineteenth-century 
English philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke called this arrange-
ment the “social contract.”
Almost by definition, governance and the social contract have been 
severely damaged in a COIN environment; the state is unwilling or un-
able to provide for the population, and the population is unable or unwill-
24 Parameters
ing to support the state. Typically, local leaders or insurgents become a de
facto state. US forces and civilians need to work with and develop existing 
leaders in order to achieve the long-term goal of creating a viable and le-
gitimate government. These acts may include working with leaders within 
the government, if it exists, and those outside government who hold pow-
er and influence with the local populace. In the early stages of COIN and 
stability operations, “good” leaders—those willing to place the needs of 
their constituents above their own—may be hard to find. In many of these 
cases, the military and civilian agencies may be forced to work with less-
than-savory leaders, including insurgents, in an effort to achieve initial ob-
jectives. Not all leaders in an insurgency are capable of contributing to a 
viable government, but neither are all insurgent leaders necessarily bad. 
Some insurgent leaders may have a good deal of popular support due to 
their commitment to improving the circumstances of the local populace. 
In cases where these leaders are amenable to power-sharing and compro-
mise, they potentially can be valuable allies. Long-term success in COIN 
requires distinguishing between the useful and nonuseful leaders, and then 
managing problematic leaders in a manner that will add to the viability of 
the state. This is no small task.
In order to achieve the long-term goal of a stable and viable state, 
it is important to have a vision for the form of governance most appropri-
ate for the host nation. The Guide specifically names “stable democracy” 
as the long-term goal of this pillar, which includes “legitimate systems of 
political representation at the national, provincial, and local levels; effec-
tive ministries; political parties; free media; and robust civil society.”16
While a stable democracy is perhaps the best form of government 
for realizing the social contract and the maintenance of a viable state in 
the long-term, it is worth noting some of the challenges related to creating 
a democracy. Mature, stable democracies take time—perhaps decades—to 
develop. Fostering democracy requires a long-term commitment, from the 
host nation and the external states and agencies committed to the nation’s 
development. The path to democracy is often difficult and may even be the 
source of instability and conflict, particularly if the population organizes 
and votes along ethnic lines, giving electoral success to the ethnic group 
with the most voting members.17
Achieving a mature democracy during stability operations may be 
an unrealistic goal. There are, however, intermediate goals toward which 
US forces, civilian agencies, and the host nation can work in their effort to 
create a stable government capable of transitioning to a democracy some-
time in the future. Clare Lockhart’s September 2009 testimony before the 
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee describes “good-enough gover-
nance” as a reasonable expectation in the near-term during stability op-
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erations. Good-enough governance focuses on a limited number of key 
functions the government should perform: security; a structure and process 
for decisionmaking within the rule of law; accountability in public finance; 
and basic services to the population. With regard to Afghanistan, Lockhart 
names five such services: irrigation for agriculture; basic transportation in-
frastructure (such as roads); basic healthcare and education; potable water; 
and electricity.18
Intermediate goals in governance should focus on inculcating the 
rights and responsibilities of citizenship: voting, civic participation, and 
taxation. Educating the population and establishing legitimate expectations 
toward the government are some of the initial steps for a stable govern-
ment, and in the long-term, a democracy.
Justice
Justice contains two components: law, and its implementation. A 
state should codify laws that are equally binding on all the populace, and 
which provide a sense of justice and fairness. A nation’s laws should en-
compass four broad areas at a minimum: politics (such as constitutional 
law); economics (such as contract law and property rights); society (laws 
that govern relationships between citizens); and civil obedience (laws that 
govern the relationship between citizens and the state).19 States may also 
want to consider instituting laws that conform to international norms and 
treaties, such as human rights practices, international maritime agreements, 
and so on.
Most democracies have a constitution as the supreme law of the 
land. Although the norm, not all democracies have a constitution; Israel 
and Great Britain are two examples of democracies without codified con-
stitutions. Furthermore, some democracies have allowed for religious laws, 
such as Islamic sharia, to govern aspects of their citizens’ lives. India, for 
example, permits Muslim courts to apply sharia to govern family matters, 
but criminal and civil issues are managed according to secular laws codi-
fied by the state.
It is necessary for a state’s police force and court system to work 
together to enforce and apply the various laws. Therefore, it is necessary 
that a state possess a professionalized police force, jails, courts, and trained 
lawyers and judges.20 In a COIN environment, oftentimes the state lacks 
the necessary ingredients to ensure justice—its laws may no longer be val-
id or applicable, the police force may be in disarray, lawyers and judges 
are nonexistent, and basic infrastructure, such as courthouses and prisons, 
have been damaged or destroyed. All of this needs to be constituted in or-
der for justice to be established.
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Building human capacity is primary for the implementation of jus-
tice. Both the military and civilian agencies play important roles in train-
ing and advising individuals and groups responsible for executing the law 
and order functions. Likewise, the population requires education related to 
the judicial process and the rights and responsibilities of citizens in promot-
ing justice.
Social Capital and National Identity
In addition to the five pillars, there are two other pillars that are key 
to long-term success in a COIN environment: social capital and a state’s na-
tional identity. These pillars focus on the population and social cohesion at 
the community and state levels. Both require the attention of US forces and 
civilian agencies in order to support the long-term goals of COIN.
SocialCapital
Social capital refers to the “informal norms” (unofficial rules) that 
create trust and cooperation between individuals. Examples of informal 
norms include things such as handshake agreements, keeping unwritten 
promises, and the “golden rule” (doing unto others as you would have oth-
ers do unto you). Social capital, in other words, is one of the major factors 
holding groups and societies together; it is often summarized in one word: 
trust.21 Much of the social capital that coalesces societies is transparent and 
often taken for granted. It evolves over time and is inculcated through so-
cialization, or behavior shaped by the actions of the larger group.
Often in war-torn societies, and especially as a result of civil wars or 
insurgencies, the trust that holds a society together has been either damaged 
or destroyed. Negative forms of social capital, such as loyalty to one’s ethnic 
or religious group, can take hold and prevent a particular faction of the soci-
ety from trusting others. Under these circumstances, social capital needs to 
be reconstructed if the society and state are to function successfully.
Social capital, however, is not directly constructed; it is the norms 
and unofficial rules that evolve over time and are often the indirect byprod-
uct of interaction in a variety of situations. US forces and civilian agencies 
have an important role to play in reconstituting social capital. From the ear-
liest stages of COIN, US forces and civilian agencies need to create situa-
tions where groups are provided with  incentives to interact and build trust.
One example of how to develop social capital comes from post-Tal-
iban Afghanistan and the creation in 2003 of the National Solidarity Pro-
gram. Rather than having nongovernmental or international organizations 
rebuild infrastructure in towns and provinces, development money was 
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pooled in Kabul and each town received block grants that it could use for 
projects. In order to receive these grants, Community Development Coun-
cils were required at the local level to discuss and vote on which projects 
should be implemented. Larger projects, such as bridges, required villag-
es to “pool” their credits and collaborate on which projects should be im-
plemented. Building and reconstructing infrastructure became the stimulus 
compelling individuals to negotiate, make decisions, and take ownership 
of development projects outside their own communities. The byproduct of 
this process was social capital.22
Rebuilding social capital needs to be initiated at the beginning of 
any COIN operation and continue throughout stability operations, culmi-
nating in the creation of a viable state. Individuals and local organizations 
need to recognize common interests—across ethnic, tribal, or religious di-
vides—in order for a populace to properly cohere and function; such coop-
eration is not likely to happen on its own.
AState’sNationalIdentity
National identity, like social capital, is essential for the long-term 
viability of the nation. Similar to social capital, there are good and bad na-
tional identities. Bad national identities are those that divide society and 
exclude individuals or groups. Examples of bad national identities may in-
clude those based on ethnicity, religion, kinship, tribe, or race. Often in 
a post-conflict society, especially following civil wars and insurgencies, a 
state’s national identity has been damaged, and individuals are susceptible 
to identifying with whichever group provides the greatest degree of safety 
and protection.23
In order for a state to function properly, its citizens need to have a 
common identity with one another and the state. In the United States, na-
tional identity is based on the ideals of the state, which are enshrined in the 
Constitution. American military forces take an oath of allegiance to uphold 
the Constitution, not the President, a particular group, or even US territo-
ry. Citizenship is based on being born in the United States, or through im-
migration and naturalization for individuals born elsewhere. In theory, any 
otherwise qualified person is entitled to citizenship irrespective of race, 
gender, ethnicity, or religion. Finally, being a US citizen comes with civic 
responsibilities, such as jury duty, voting, and taxation.
This form of national identity is commonly called “civic national-
ism;” it is based on loyalty to rule of law, governing principles, citizen-
ship, and participation. Civic nationalism is a particularly useful form of 
national identity for multiethnic states because it permits individuals or 
groups to maintain their ethnic identities, while subsuming them under the 
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broader identity based on citizenship and participation.24 National identi-
ty is learned, not assumed. This is true even for national identity based on 
race, ethnicity, tribe, and religion. In the United States, citizens are formally 
schooled in civic national identity through schools, military service, televi-
sion, other forms of media, informally at home, and through social capital.
US military forces and civilian agencies need to help foster a sense 
of national identity in which all can participate. A sense of national iden-
tity should be formally taught within the education system. US forces and 
civilian agencies should also promote a sense of national identity, as part 
of military and police training, and civil service. National identity can be 
fostered informally through television, sports programs, and other forms of 
popular culture.
Stage 3: A Functioning State
Transitioning from stability operations to a functioning state re-
quires the phasing out of large-scale foreign involvement and the ability of 
the state to stand, independent of external assistance.25 This transition in-
cludes the departure of nongovernmental organizations that provided ser-
vices in lieu of the state, the withdrawal of security forces that kept the 
peace, and an end to the state’s dependency on foreign aid for the bulk of 
its gross domestic product. Until a state can provide these basic services, 
it is not truly independent or viable. The goal of nongovernmental organi-
zations, international organizations, the US military, and civilian agencies 
should be to work themselves out of the stability operations business.
Defining the parameters of a functioning state is critical for the 
long-term success of a counterinsurgency, because without a final vision of 
the state and society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop strategies. 
As previously mentioned, insurgency is primarily a political problem, and 
the emergence of insurgent groups signifies that the relationship between 
the government and the people is not sufficient to obtain long-term objec-
tives. The long-term goals of a counterinsurgency require a strong relation-
ship between a state’s government and its people; returning to the status
quoante is not acceptable because it does not resolve the underlying po-
litical problems. Without solving these problems, future insurgencies are 
likely to reemerge.
The nineteenth-century sociologist Max Weber defined a state as 
a government with “a monopoly on the use of force.”26 Weber’s definition 
suggests that a state with more than one group capable of projecting force 
lacks internal sovereignty and is therefore a failed state. In other words, 
his assessment of a viable state focuses solely on security. While securi-
ty is a key component of a state, a more robust comprehension of a state’s 
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makeup is required to fully understand the long-term goals associated with 
COIN operations.
A functioning state performs several critical roles on behalf of its 
citizens, neighboring states, and the international community. First and 
foremost, a functioning state’s government should have the ability to ad-
dress its population’s needs, including basic services—such as food, po-
table water, sanitation, health care, and security—along with education, 
justice, law and order, and policies contributing to social well-being. In re-
turn, citizens may be asked to sacrifice some of their liberties. This is the 
previously described social contract. A government’s ability to ensure de-
livery of goods and services to the population over the long-term is the 
best way to prevent the reemergence of insurgencies.
In FixingFailedStates, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart name ten 
functions of a state: 
• Rule of law.
• A monopoly on violence (use of force).
• Administrative control within the government.
• Sound management of public finances.
• The creation of citizenship rights through social policy.
• The provision of infrastructure services.
• Formation of a market economy.
• Management of public assets.
• Effective public borrowing (national debt).
• Investment in human capital (education, vocational training, etc.).27
These functions capture more than just a government’s monopoly on the 
use of force. They also emphasize the four pillars of reconstruction of gov-
ernance, economic development, security and safety, and justice.
It is interesting to note that Ghani and Lockhart highlight not only 
the creation of a market economy as a necessary function of the state, but 
also that the government needs to manage its debt, both in public borrow-
ing and overall finances. A nation that is dependent on foreign aid does not 
meet these requirements; ultimately, a state needs to become fiscally self-
reliant in order to be considered fully functional.28 At the earliest stages of 
population engagement and stability operations, actions need to be institut-
ed that will aid in creating a self-sustaining state.
Ghani and Lockhart’s list stresses the importance of developing 
“human capital,” or the population’s potential through education, voca-
tional training, and other forms of enrichment. Developing human capi-
tal is a critical part of any state’s ability to be self-sustaining. Educated 
and trained people are required to run the nation, police its population, de-
fend its borders, create and maintain the economy, and further educate and 
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train future generations. Initiatives need to be instituted early in popula-
tion engagement and stability operations to “train the trainer” and estab-
lish educational programs specifically designed to develop human capital. 
Ghani and Lockhart stress that developing human capital includes public 
health programs, necessary to maintain a productive workforce and qual-
ity of life.29
Finally, Ghani and Lockhart’s ten functions allow for different 
forms of government to run a state. While democracy may be the most ob-
vious expression of these functions, the list does not exclusively require it. 
It is worth noting that other forms of government may do a better job of 
meeting the people’s needs. For example, the United Arab Emirates is not 
a liberal democracy, but it meets most, if not all, of the ten functions. Fo-
cusing on the functions of a state, as opposed to its specific form of govern-
ment, may allow for greater flexibility in US counterinsurgency operations.
Although not included in Ghani and Lockhart’s list, a state’s gov-
ernment should also be able to provide stability and maintain the security 
of its borders. A failed state often results in its citizens fleeing in order to 
find security and economic opportunity. Refugees are often a source of re-
gional instability; Afghan refugees in Pakistan are a case in point. Failed 
states also run the risk of presenting opportunities for nefarious groups, 
such as drug traffickers, insurgents, and terrorist organizations. A truly sta-
ble and functioning state needs to understand it has obligations that extend 
beyond its borders.
Conclusion
Winning the counterinsurgency requires transforming the battle of 
population engagement into the long-term goal of a stable and function-
ing state—with a government that can stand on its own, provide for its cit-
izens, and promote regional and international stability over time. Actions 
taken in the early stages of COIN and stability operations should work 
toward the long-term goal of creating a viable and fully functional state. 
Without these long-term objectives, stability is unlikely.
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